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Abstract
Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human
behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how
risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this ques-
tion in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and
monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary
decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of
money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayes-
ian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to prob-
abilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results
highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying
risky decision making.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Olfaction is a fundamental sense that plays an important role in guiding
behavior in humans and other animals, for instance, by signaling when
food might be dangerous to ingest or when there is a nearby environ-
mental hazard, such as fire (Stevenson, 2009). In this vein, odors have
been shown to play an important part in decision processes, including
food choice (e.g., Demattè, Endrizzi, & Gasperi, 2014; Gaillet-Torrent,
Sulmont-Rossé, Issanchou, Chabanet, & Chambaron, 2014) and
selecting a partner (e.g., Ferdenzi, Delplanque, Atanassova, & Sander,
2016; Herz & Cahill, 1997). Furthermore, odors strongly affect cogni-
tive, affective, and physiological processes (e.g., Coppin, Parma, &
Pause, 2016; Herz, Eliassen, Beland, & Souza, 2004; Mohanty &
Gottfried, 2013) that, in turn, also influence decision processes. How-
ever, so far, olfactory stimuli play a surprisingly small role in research
on decision making compared with visual or even auditory materials
(e.g., Oud & Coppin, 2012), even though the required technology to
study olfaction is readily accessible to researchers (e.g., Ischer et al.,
2014; Sharvit, Dell'Acqua, & Vuilleumier, 2018). The goal of the pre-
sent research was to gain a better understanding of how olfactory
stimuli shape decision processes. Specifically, we investigated how the
affective nature of odors changes the processes underlying risky
choice using a computational modeling approach.
1.1 | Risky decision making and odors
Decision making under risk refers to choices between options that dif-
fer in the attractiveness or valence of their outcomes and the proba-
bility with which these outcomes occur. A typical example is the
decision to buy insurance. Buying insurance entails a small but certain
loss—the payment of a premium—whereas not buying insurance can
result in either no loss or a major loss depending on whether the
Received: 13 May 2019 Revised: 12 February 2020 Accepted: 12 February 2020
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.2178
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
J Behav Dec Making. 2020;1–13. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bdm 1
event covered by the insurance occurs. To study how people make
decisions under risk, past studies often used lotteries with monetary
gains or losses (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; McGraw, Shafir, &
Todorov, 2010). Outcomes of risky decision problems, however, are
not strictly monetary but often involve nonmonetary outcomes, as
when one must decide between different treatment options for a
medical problem or choose between different career opportunities.
Although there is a large literature on the influence of odors on
consumer behavior (for reviews see, Bradford & Desrochers, 2009;
Rimkute, Moraes, & Ferreira, 2016), so far, only a few studies have
investigated how odors influence decision making under risk (Ditto,
Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, & Macdonald, 2006; Festjens, Bruyneel, &
Dewitte, 2018; Hirsch, 1995; Kechagia & Drichoutis, 2017; Stancak
et al., 2015). Specifically, Hirsch conducted a field experiment on the
casino floor of a Las Vegas hotel. He scented two slot machine areas
with two distinctive but pleasant odorants,1 whereas a third area was
left unscented. The amount of gambling in one of the scented areas
increased significantly compared with the amount of gambling in the
same area before and after the experimental manipulation, whereas
the amount of gambling in the other scented area and the control area
did not change. Hirsch proposed that the effect was mediated by a
mood change induced by the odor. In contrast, Kechagia and
Drichoutis (2017)) more recently did not find an effect of a pleasant
ambient odor on risk preferences in a lottery task using a citrus scent.
Finally, Stancak et al. (2015) found an increase in loss aversion while
smelling an unpleasant odor (methyl mercaptan) but not a decrease in
loss aversion while smelling a pleasant odor (jasmine). These studies
suggest that odors may influence decisions under risk; however, in
particular in regard to pleasant odors, the results are inconsistent. Fur-
thermore, these studies all focused on the influence of “incidental”
odors, that is, odors that were part of the context in which a decision
took place but independent of the actual outcomes in the decision-
making task. Yet, in many situations, odors are an integral feature of
the decision option itself, such as in food or mate choice, where odors
have been shown to play an important role in guiding choices
(e.g., Ferdenzi et al., 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2017).
To our knowledge, there are only two studies that systematically
investigated how olfactory stimulus material affects decision making
under risk, that is, how decision makers choose among different odors
or stimulus material with an olfactory component (Ditto et al., 2006;
Festjens et al., 2018). Ditto et al. (2006) found in a risky decision task
with cookies that participants who received only a description of the
cookies they could win were more likely to accept the gamble when
the probability of winning was high than when it was low. In contrast,
participants who could see and smell the (freshly baked) cookies were
equally likely to accept the gamble independent of the probability of
winning the cookies. This result indicates that the olfactory cue
(i.e., cookie scent) contributed to the changes in the decision process,
suggesting that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when
they were able to smell the cookies. In addition, the authors found
that smelling the cookies increased participants' desire to win (i.e., the
subjective value) and their perceived odds of winning, which both
could have influenced their willingness to take risks. A mediation anal-
ysis testing whether perceived odds of winning or the perceived desir-
ability of the cookies could explain the choice effects did not show
any significant results. Furthermore, Festjens et al. (2018) failed to
replicate the results reported by Ditto et al. In sum, to date, there is
little research investigating the role of olfactory stimuli in risky deci-
sion making, and the results so far are ambiguous.
1.2 | Risky decision making with affect-rich and
affect-poor stimulus material
Although little research has investigated how odors change the deci-
sion process, a relatively large number of studies have examined how
risky decision making changes when outcomes are affect rich
(i.e., elicit strong affective responses) compared with affect poor
(i.e., elicit only weak or no affective responses; e.g., Hsee &
Rottenstreich, 2004; Lejarraga, Pachur, Frey, & Hertwig, 2016;
Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2014; Pachur, Suter, & Hertwig, 2017;
Petrova, Van der Pligt, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Rottenstreich &
Hsee, 2001; Sunstein & Zeckhauser, 2011; Suter, Pachur, & Hertwig,
2016). Given the salient hedonic dimension of odors (e.g., Mohanty &
Gottfried, 2013; for an overview, see O'Doherty, 2007), these studies
seem highly relevant when exploring how olfactory stimuli can change
risky decision making.
In a seminal paper, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001; Study 3) com-
pared how much participants were willing to pay to avoid gambles
that resulted in either a loss of 20 USD or a mild electric shock with
either a 1% or 99% chance. Participants were willing to pay a median
amount of 18 USD to avoid a gamble with a 99% probability of losing
20 USD, but only 1 USD if the probability of the loss was just 1%.
When the outcome was an electric shock, however, the median will-
ingness to pay for the gambles was 10 USD and 7 USD for the 99%
and 1% gamble, respectively. The authors argued that with affect-rich
outcomes, people differentiate between certain and probabilistic out-
comes but are insensitive to intermediate probability variations. Sub-
sequently, a number of studies have shown a similar reduction in
sensitivity to probabilities in risky choices with affect-rich outcomes
using negative outcomes, such as medical side effects, and positive
outcomes, such as holiday vouchers (e.g., Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004;
Pachur et al., 2014; Suter et al., 2016; but see Klein et al., 2018, for a
failed attempt to replicate Rottenstreich & Hsee's, 2001, Study 1).
The results also hold when values of the nonmonetary and monetary
outcomes were carefully matched for each participant and when
probabilities were provided or learned through experience
(e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016).
To understand the changes in the decision process better, Pachur
et al. (2014, 2017) and Suter et al. (2016) modeled participants'
choices with cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). CPT assumes that people's choices between risky options can
be described by an expectation-based calculus that multiplies the sub-
jective value of the outcomes by the subjective probabilities. CPT1Unfortunately, the components of the fragrances used by Hirsch were not published.
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captures how the objective outcomes and probabilities are perceived
on a subjective level using two functions, the value function and the
probability weighting function. For monetary gambles, the probability
weighting function usually takes the form of an inverse-S shape, indi-
cating that in the decision process, people tend to place more weight
on small probabilities and less on large probabilities (e.g., Abdellaoui,
2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Pachur et al. (2017) showed that
with affect-rich outcomes, the probability weighting function became
more strongly curved, meaning that test subjects differentiated less
between low and high probabilities. This supports the idea that insen-
sitivity to differences in probabilities underlies the changes observed
with affect-rich nonmonetary outcomes as compared with monetary
outcomes.
1.3 | Risky decision making with real nonmonetary
outcomes
Given the strong affective dimensions of odors, it seems likely that
outcomes with an olfactory dimension should lead to a similar change
in the sensitivity to probabilities in risky gambles. However, the large
majority of studies on the influence of affect-rich outcomes on risky
decision making have been conducted with hypothetical outcomes,
and to date, only a handful have investigated risky decision making
and probability weighting with real, nonmonetary outcomes (including
the two studies using outcomes with an olfactory dimension reported
above). These studies, which we review below, present a more ambig-
uous picture.
Specifically, four studies reported comparable findings with those
of studies with hypothetical outcomes (Abdellaoui & Kemel, 2014;
Ditto et al., 2006; Rosati & Hare, 2016; Sunstein & Zeckhauser,
2011). The study by Abdellaoui and Kemel (2014) used time as a non-
monetary outcome, the studies by Rosati and Hare (2016) and Ditto
et al. (2006) food, and the study by Sunstein and Zeckhauser (2011)
electric shocks. Two studies had a monetary control group
(Abdellaoui & Kemel, 2014; Rosati & Hare, 2016), one a nonmonetary
but likely affect-poor outcome (Ditto et al., 2006), and one study did
not include a control group (Sunstein & Zeckhauser, 2011).
One study reported results pointing in the opposite direction
(Krawczyk, 2015). Krawczyk compared probability weighting in
decisions with real monetary and nonmonetary outcomes
(vouchers) that differed in their stakes (i.e., value of vouchers and
monetary gains could be high or low) and the affect richness of
the vouchers (high or low). The affect elicited by the vouchers was
manipulated by selecting affect-poor vouchers (for a local discount
supermarket) and affect-rich vouchers (for a leisure and recreation
company), where affect richness was established in a pretest. If the
stakes were low, the outcome type did not affect probability
weighting. If the stakes were high, participants underweighted
probabilities when gambling with vouchers. However, the differ-
ence from monetary outcomes was largest for the affect-poor
vouchers, which is in contrast to the idea that the differences in
affect caused a diminished sensitivity to probabilities.
Two studies reported null effects, one by Festjens et al. (2018)
attempting to replicate the study by Ditto et al. (2006) and one by
Hayden and Platt (2009) comparing risky choices with juice and
money. Last, a set of two studies measuring probability weighting in a
risky decision-making task using real electric shocks as outcomes
found nonlinear probability weighting functions that corresponded to
the inverse-S-shaped function frequently reported for monetary gam-
bles (Berns, Capra, Chappelow, Moore, & Noussair, 2008; Berns,
Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2007). The studies did not contain a con-
trol group with monetary losses, but the estimated probability curva-
ture parameters from CPT corresponded closely to the values
reported in the literature on risky decision making with monetary
gambles (Abdellaoui, 2000; Berns et al., 2007; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). This suggests no change in probability weighting when using
presumably affect-rich electric shocks.
2 | PRESENT STUDY
In sum, to our knowledge, only two studies have investigated how
risky decision processes change when the outcomes themselves have
an olfactory component, and their results are inconsistent (Ditto et al.,
2006; Festjens et al., 2018). Research on risky decision making with
nonolfactory affect-rich outcomes suggests systematic changes in
probability weighting, but these studies largely relied on hypothetical
scenarios. The few studies that have used real nonmonetary out-
comes reported somewhat inconsistent results and are difficult to
compare due to methodological differences. In the present study, we
investigated how the processes of risky decision making change when
using olfactory stimuli as outcomes compared with monetary out-
comes. We use a within-participant design with repeated measure-
ments to increase power. In addition we use a computational
modeling approach to trace which processes are influenced by the
type of stimulus. We pursue two interlinked goals. First, we aimed at
testing whether olfactory stimuli influence risky decision making. Spe-
cifically, we investigated whether the olfactory nature of the stimuli
would affect participants' sensitivity to probabilities even when con-
trolling for the subjective value of the outcomes. Given the inherently
affect-rich nature of olfactory stimuli (e.g., Mohanty & Gottfried,
2013) and following the results from hypothetical studies on risky
decision making with affect-rich stimuli, we expected that when
choosing among olfactory outcomes, people would be less sensitive
to probabilities than when choosing among monetary outcomes. In
the context of CPT, we expected this to be reflected in a more
strongly curved probability weighting function.
Second, existing studies that tested decision processes using real
affect-rich outcomes yielded inconsistent results. To better under-
stand the effect of real affect-rich outcomes requires a methodologi-
cally rigorous study. Odors are well suited for this task. Besides being
inherently affect rich, odors can be studied in a laboratory setting
(e.g., Coppin et al., 2014; Coppin, Delplanque, Porcherot, Cayeux, &
Sander, 2012), and they lend themselves to consecutive presentations
within a repeated-measurement design, minimizing carryover effects
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when using an appropriate interstimulus interval. Thus, using olfactory
stimuli that are matched in value to monetary outcomes on an individ-
ual level makes it possible to use real nonmonetary outcomes that are
genuinely affect rich and can be compared with a monetary control
condition with the same perceived value.
3 | METHOD
To investigate these research questions, we conducted an experiment
in which participants either lost money or encountered an unpleasant
odor with a given probability. We used unpleasant odors because they
elicit strong hedonic experiences (Schleidt, Neumann, & Morishita,
1988). To account for individual differences in affective reactions to
unpleasant odors (Ferdenzi et al., 2013), following a literature review
and a pilot study, we selected eight odors that most people have per-
ceived as unpleasant (Chrea et al., 2009; Delplanque et al., 2008; Fer-
denzi et al., 2011). In the main study, we asked participants to smell
each of these odors and indicate how much they would be willing to
pay to avoid smelling them again for 1 min. On the basis of these
willingness-to-pay (WTP) judgments, we then selected for each per-
son four odors for which their WTP judgments differed and con-
structed two sets of 42 pairs of gambles for each participant, one set
involving odors and one set involving monetary losses (details on the
selection of the odors and the construction of the gamble pairs are
reported in Section 3.2). Gambles involving odors and monetary losses
were matched so that the monetary losses equaled the amount of
money a participant was willing to pay to avoid smelling the respec-
tive odor. At the end of the experiment, one decision was randomly
selected for each participant and played out. The result determined
the participant's outcome. Written consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants before starting the experiment in accordance with the Decla-
ration of Helsinki, and the study was approved by the ethical
committees of the Psychology Department of the University of
Geneva.
3.1 | Participants
Sixty students (52 women and eight men) from the University of
Geneva participated in the study. To be able to detect a middle-sized
effect (d) between 0.4 and 0.5 with a statistical power of 0.8 would
require a sample size between 34 and 52 participants (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). We decided to include 60 participants to
ensure a large-enough power.
Participation was limited to nonsmokers who reported a normal
sense of smell and who did not suffer from a respiratory infection.
Mean age was 21.6 years (SD = 3.89). On average, the study took
50 min. Participants received a fixed payment of 10 Swiss francs
(CHF) as compensation for participation. In addition, they could
receive a bonus of up to 15 CHF depending on their decisions during
the experiment (average amount paid was 24 CHF ≈ 25 USD; details
on how payoffs were determined are reported in Section 3.3).
For the analysis of the choice data, we excluded 12 participants
because they indicated fewer than three unique WTPs >0 for the
odors in the first part of the experiment, which made it impossible to
construct enough monetary gambles for these participants. The
remaining 48 participants (seven men and 41 women) had an average
age of 21.8 years. Another 16 participants indicated only three unique
WTP judgments >0. For these, we restricted the analysis to the
21 gambles for which we could equate odors and monetary losses.
3.2 | Materials
3.2.1 | Odors
The eight odors used in the experiment were all rated as unpleasant
but varied in their average ratings. Selected odors were pungent body
odor, civet, old socks, cheese, sulfur and onions, feces, sweat, and cig-
arettes. All olfactory stimuli were injected into the reservoirs of cylin-
drical felt-tip pens (length 14 cm; inner diameter 1.3 cm). By using
these “odor pens” (produced by Burghart, Germany), we avoided con-
taminating the environment with the odors.
3.2.2 | WTP judgments
To equate odors with monetary losses, participants rated how
unpleasant they found each of the eight odors on a 7-point Likert
scale of 1 (do not like at all) to 7 (like very much) and indicated how
much they were willing to pay to avoid smelling it for 1 min continu-
ously. Participants received the odor pens from the experimenter in a
random order determined by the experimental software. To smell an
odor, participants were asked to open the pen, hold it under their
nose, take a breath, and close the pen again. Afterward, they were
instructed to respond to questions about the odor in a computerized
survey at their own speed and to tell the experimenter when they
were ready to continue with the next odor. They were informed that
they could ask to smell a fairly neutral odor (coffee) after each
unpleasant odor, which they could smell for as long as they wanted.
To facilitate remembering each odor, the names were presented
together with a picture (see also Figure 1) on a computer screen. To
ensure that participants indicated their true WTP, they were informed
that at the end of the study, one of their decisions in the study would
be randomly selected to determine their final payoff (i.e., one of the
WTP judgments or one of the gambles). If a WTP judgment was cho-
sen, they would enter a Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) auction
based on their WTP judgment (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964).2
We selected four odors for which participants responded with WTP
2A BDM auction is a method for ensuring that people provide their true WTP. If a BDM
auction was played, a number from the range in which the WTP could lie was drawn (in our
case, between 0 and 15 CHF). If the number was lower than or equal to the WTP, the
participant paid this sum but did not smell the odor. If the number was larger than the WTP
indicated, the participant had to smell the odor.
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judgments >0 and ≤15 CHF,3 maximizing the range of WTP judg-
ments for each participant.
3.2.3 | Gambles
On the basis of the WTP judgments for the four selected odors, we
created two sets of 42 gamble pairs that involved a choice either
between two unpleasant odors or between two monetary losses. In
each gamble, the negative outcomes (monetary losses or unpleasant
odors) would occur with a certain probability and no loss otherwise
(see Figure 1 for an example). In the monetary gambles, the loss
amounts were matched to the individual WTP judgments for the pres-
ented odors. This allowed a direct comparison between the choices in
the odor sets and the monetary sets.
The 42 gamble pairs were constructed by creating all possible
pairs of the four selected odors and a set of seven pairs of proba-
bilities denoting the probability of a loss in the two gambles (.02
vs. .5; .1 vs. .6; .1 vs. .99; .2 vs. .4; .3 vs. .7; .3 vs. .9; .6 vs. .8).
The more negative outcome (i.e., higher monetary loss or more
negatively rated odor) was always presented with the lower proba-
bility, and the less negative outcome with the higher probability to
avoid dominant options. We selected the pairs of probabilities so
that (a) the probability of the worse loss would vary between very
low (.02) and relatively high (.6) and that (b) the difference in the
probability of losing between the two gambles covered a broad
range of values (between .2 and .89). Table A1 provides an over-
view of all gamble pairs.
3.3 | Procedure
Participants performed the task in a well-ventilated room at the
University of Geneva. First, they responded to questions regarding
their sense of smell, age, and gender and how hungry they were
and then continued to smell and rate the odors (WTP judgment
phase). After the WTP judgment phase, participants continued with
the decision problems. Equal numbers of participants started with
either money or odor decisions. We varied between participants
whether they first saw the money or the odor gambles. Within the
odor and money block, we randomly determined the order of the
gamble pairs for each participant. After 22 decisions, participants
were encouraged to take a short break.
Before starting with the decision task, participants were
informed that they would receive an extra 15 CHF for the study.
At the end of the study, one of their decisions in the study
(i.e., either one of the eight WTP judgments or one of the
84 pairwise gambles) was randomly selected and played to deter-
mine their payoff. If a monetary gamble was randomly selected,
participants would receive the 15 CHF minus the amount they lost
in the gamble. If an odor gamble was selected, they could choose
whether they would like to smell the odor and receive the full
15 CHF or receive the 15 CHF minus the WTP judgment they had
indicated for this odor. If a WTP rating was chosen, a BDM auc-
tion was played, and they either had to pay or had to smell
depending on the outcome.
3The upper limit was set to 15 CHF to guarantee that a potential loss in the gamble selected
to determine a participant's payoff would not exceed the bonus payment.
F IGURE 1 (a) A pair of gambles from the odor decisions. (b) A pair of gambles from the monetary decisions. Picture credits: “Poop”: stock
photo, iStock.com/phanuchat; “Sweated man”: stock photo, iStock.com/deeepblue; “Spotlight on Modern Swiss Francs”: stock photo, iStock.
com/ScottNodine [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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4 | RESULTS
4.1 | WTP judgments and selection of odors
Participants differed in which odors they found most unpleasant as
well as in their WTP judgments. Ratings of the odors were highly cor-
related with WTP judgments (mean r = −.80, SD = 0.19). Figure 2a
shows the average WTP judgments participants indicated for the
eight odors. Figure 2b shows the average WTP judgments for the four
selected odors ordered by their rank. The WTP judgments by rank
represent the average monetary losses employed in the monetary
gambles (see also Table A1).
4.2 | Choices
In the main analysis, we first analyzed whether people differed in the
choices they made when outcomes were odors or monetary losses.
For each individual, we calculated the proportion of choices of the
option with the higher loss and the lower probability of losing (which
in most cases was the more risky option) and the proportion of
choices of the option with the higher expected value (for the odors
based on their respective WTP judgments). On average, participants
chose the risky option less frequently when deciding between odors
(M = 0.56, SD = 0.25) than when deciding between monetary losses
(M = 0.72, SD = 0.21). A Bayesian paired t test conducted in JASP (ver-
sion 0.8.4; JASP Team, 2017) using the default prior (i.e., Cauchy with
a 0.707 scale) provided strong evidence of a difference between the
proportions. The obtained Bayes factor (BF10) was 33.70, Cohen's
d = 0.52. Similarly, participants were more likely to choose the option
with the higher expected value when deciding between money gam-
bles than between odor gambles (Mmoney = 0.77, SD = 0.16
vs. Modor = 0.69, SD = 0.16, BF10 = 4.32, Cohen's d = 0.37). Both
results are in line with the idea that participants in the affect-rich odor
condition were less sensitive to differences in probabilities and tended
to avoid the outcome with the higher loss.
One potential alternative explanation of the results could be that
choices for the odor gambles were simply noisier and thus closer to
the 50% choice share expected for random guessing. If this is the
case, choice shares should be closer to 50% for all odor gambles com-
pared with choice shares in the respective monetary gambles. That is,
if in a monetary gamble 70% of participants chose the risky option,
the choice share should be lower (i.e., closer to 50%) in the matched
odor gamble—similar to what we would find on the average level.
However, if in a monetary gamble only 30% of participants chose the
risky option, the choice share should be higher (i.e., closer to 50%) in
the matched odor gamble. And if the choice share in a monetary gam-
ble was close to 50%, a similar choice share would be expected in the
matched odor gamble. In contrast, if participants are indeed less sensi-
tive to probabilities in odor gambles than in monetary gambles, choice
shares in the odor gambles should be lower than in the monetary
gambles in all cases. In sum, the noise hypothesis predicts an interac-
tion between choice shares for the risky option in the monetary gam-
bles and gamble type, whereas the insensitivity hypothesis predicts a
main effect of gamble type and no interaction.
To test this, we conducted a logistic mixed model analysis
using the mixed function in the afex package in R with a binomial
link function and a likelihood ratio test (Singmann, Bolker,
Westfall, & Aust, 2016) predicting participants' choices of the risky
option (i.e., option with worse outcome) with gamble type (mone-
tary vs. odor), the choice share of the risky option in the monetary
gambles, and the interaction of the two variables as fixed effects.
In addition, we included random intercepts for participants and
gambles. As illustrated in Figure 3, the results show a clear main
effect of gamble type, with participants being less likely to accept
the risky gamble in odor gambles, χ2(1) = 122.42, p < .001, but no
interaction, χ2(1) = 0.03, p = .867. Thus, the analyses provided no
evidence for the noise hypothesis but are in line with the insensi-
tivity hypothesis. Indeed, only in a single gamble was the propor-
tion of participants choosing the option with the worse outcome
lower for the monetary than for the odor gamble (see Table A1
for further details).
F IGURE 2 (a) The average willingness-to-
pay (WTP) judgments for all eight odors.
(b) The average WTP judgments of the selected
odors ordered by their ranks. The figure
contains data from all 60 participants. Error
bars denote bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals (CIs) of the means [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
6 VON HELVERSEN ET AL.
4.3 | Participants' payoff
Participants' final payoffs in the experiment were determined by ran-
domly selecting one of their decisions. The previous analysis showed
that participants were more likely to choose odor gambles with less
severe outcomes (i.e., a smaller loss/less unpleasant odor) but a higher
probability of losing as compared with the matched monetary gam-
bles. This apparent change in risk preferences should eventually also
affect participants' payoffs in the study. Specifically, participants for
whom an odor gamble was randomly selected as a payoff decision
faced a higher probability of losing (i.e., having to smell the odor or
incur a monetary loss) when the selected gamble was played than par-
ticipants for whom a monetary gamble was selected.
To examine whether payoffs indeed differed, we considered the
selected gamble for each participant and whether this gamble incurred
a loss when it was played. For 35 of the 60 participants, an odor gam-
ble was randomly selected as a payoff decision; for 18 participants, a
monetary gamble was selected; and for seven participants, a WTP
judgment was selected.4 Of the 35 participants for whom an odor
gamble was selected, 11 (31%) had to smell the odor or pay to avoid
smelling it. In contrast, of the 18 participants for whom a monetary
gamble was selected, only one (6%) lost money when the gamble was
played. To test whether the selected odor gambles had a higher likeli-
hood of losing than the selected monetary gambles, we conducted a
directed Bayesian independent multinomial contingency test (JASP
Team, 2017) with default priors. Results of this test showed that the
loss likelihood was indeed higher for odor gambles than for monetary
gambles (BF+0 = 5.51, directed test, N = 53).
Of the 11 participants who lost the selected odor gamble, seven
decided to smell the odor and four decided to pay to avoid smelling
the odor. These somewhat balanced choice shares suggest that over-
all, the WTP judgments accurately reflected participants' valuations.
4.4 | Modeling with CPT
To analyze whether the differences in the observed decisions stem
from a change in the probability weighting function as suggested by
the literature on hypothetical affect-rich gambles, we modeled the
observed choices with CPT (for details, see Appendix B). Following
previous research (Lejarraga et al., 2016; Pachur et al., 2017; Suter
et al., 2016), we used the four-parameter version of CPT, with the
alpha parameter defining the curvature of the utility function, the
delta and gamma parameters defining the elevation and curvature of
the probability weighting function, respectively, and the theta param-
eter capturing choice sensitivity.5
We implemented CPT in a hierarchical Bayesian framework,
assuming for each parameter a joint distribution at the group level
across both odor and monetary decisions and one additional parame-
ter that coded the difference between odor and monetary decisions.
We assigned each parameter a weakly informative uniform prior that
constrained the range to realistic values. We estimated the model
parameters in JAGS using three independent sampling chains with a
length of 10,000 samples each. After a moderate amount of thinning,
the chains mixed well and the sampling was efficient, as indicated by a
visual inspection of the trace plots and the Gelman–Rubin statistic
that was smaller than 1.01 for all parameters in the model.6
Figure 4 illustrates the posterior probability distributions for the
four parameters at the group level. For the alpha, delta, and theta
parameters, there was no credible (i.e., significant) difference between
monetary and odor gambles. For the gamma parameter, a credible dif-
ference between the odor and money gambles was observed
(BF10 = 27).
Figure 5 contrasts the estimated probability weighting functions
for odor and monetary decisions across all participants. For the mone-
tary decisions, the average probability weighting function is somewhat
concave, suggesting that participants mostly overweighed the proba-
bilities (see Figure 5a). For the odor decisions (Figure 5b), the average
probability weighting function takes the usual inverse-S shape and is
more strongly curved than the probability weighting function for the
monetary gambles. Again, most participants showed relatively flat cur-
ves for a large range of probabilities, resulting in overweighting of low
probabilities and suggesting a diminished sensitivity to differences in
probabilities. However, individuals differed strongly in the elevation
4Odor gambles were more likely to be selected as payoff decisions than monetary gambles
because participants with only three unique WTPs >0 played 42 odor decisions and only
21 monetary decisions.
5An additional analysis assuming θ = 1 led to the same conclusions.
6See online supplementary material for the JAGS code.
F IGURE 3 Gambles are grouped by choice shares for the risky
option in the monetary gambles: ≤40% (N = 4 gambles), between 40%
and 60% (N = 8 gambles), and ≥60% (N = 30 gambles). Error bars
denote standard errors for proportions
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of the curves, with some participants underweighting low and over-
weighting high levels of probabilities.
5 | DISCUSSION
To reach a better understanding of how decision making changes
when outcomes are affect rich, unpleasant, olfactory stimuli compared
with monetary losses, we asked participants in a laboratory experi-
ment to make a series of decisions involving real consequences (mon-
etary losses or smelling unpleasant odors) that were matched in
subjective value. On a behavioral level, participants were more likely
to choose the more risky option in the monetary gambles than in the
odor gambles, suggesting that participants were less sensitive to dif-
ferences in probabilities with odor gambles. In line with these findings,
modeling participants' choices with CPT using a Bayesian hierarchical
approach showed a more strongly curved probability weighting func-
tion for odors than for monetary gambles. These results correspond
to the literature on the changes in decision processes when outcomes
are affect rich (e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016; Pachur et al., 2014;
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Suter et al., 2016). They suggest that in
decisions involving affect-rich odors, participants' decision processes
are less sensitive to probabilities. This result extends previous findings
by Stancak et al. (2015) that unpleasant odors can increase loss aver-
sion by showing that olfactory outcomes can also affect the subjective
weighting or perception of probabilities. These insights are of direct
importance for situations in which outcomes are olfactory. Further-
more, they support the initial findings by Ditto et al. (2006) showing a
change in decision making when outcomes included an olfactory
dimension. This suggests that odors will also affect risky decision
making in situations in which odors are an integral and important fea-
ture of the outcomes, as in partner or food choice, for instance, when
deciding whether food is still edible past its expiration date.
Moreover, our study provides clear evidence that affect-rich out-
comes change sensitivity to probabilities even when outcomes are
real and decisions consequential. By using choices with real conse-
quences, we were able to investigate whether the choices participants
made with money and odors differed in “quality” in the sense that
they affected the likelihood of losing. Participants chose the gamble
with the higher expected value less frequently in the odor gambles
than in the monetary gambles. Furthermore, participants for whom
the payout gamble was an odor gamble were more likely to incur a
loss than participants for whom the payout gamble was a monetary
F IGURE 5 The estimated probability weighting functions for
(a) decisions with monetary outcomes and (b) decisions with odor
outcomes. Blue lines denote single participants; bold black lines
denote the group mean; and the shaded grey areas denote 95%
confidence intervals [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 4 Posterior probability distributions of the cumulative
prospect theory parameters on the group level for odor and
monetary decisions. Symbols indicate the means of the posterior
distribution; error bars indicate the 95% highest posterior density
intervals
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gamble. Thus, participants may be less able to choose options that
maximize their earnings when decision outcomes contain affect-rich
outcomes such as unpleasant odors.
Although our results dovetail with those of previous studies using
affect-rich outcomes (e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), there were
some noteworthy differences from studies that used real affect-rich
outcomes: Specifically, Krawczyk (2015) and Berns et al. (2007, 2008)
did not find a decrease in sensitivity for the probabilities of affect-rich
outcomes. Krawczyk used vouchers in his study and measured affect
richness with how excited participants were about receiving the
voucher. Possibly, the observed differences between affect-rich and
affect-poor vouchers in this study reflected differences not only in
affect but also in perceived utility.
For the differences from the studies by Berns et al. (2007, 2008),
there are at least two possible explanations. First, Berns et al. investi-
gated risky decisions using real affect-rich outcomes (i.e., electric
shocks) but did not have a monetary control group and thus compared
their findings with parameter estimates for gamma parameters within
CPT reported in the literature (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1992). In our study, we found differences in probability
weighting, but the average probability weighting function estimated
for the odor gambles actually resembled the parameter estimates
reported in the above-mentioned studies more closely than the proba-
bility weighting function in the monetary gambles.7 Thus, it is possible
that in the studies by Berns et al., differences in probability weighting
would have appeared if the same gambles had been presented with
matched monetary outcomes. Second, in Berns et al.'s studies, partici-
pants received immediate feedback after each choice, whereas in our
task, participants experienced the odor at the beginning but then did
not receive feedback until the payout gamble selected at the end of
the experiment. Perhaps differences in probability weighting diminish
over time when participants experience real affect-rich outcomes
repeatedly.
In addition, there are some limitations of our study. First, we
had to exclude 20% of our participants because they did not per-
ceive the odors as unpleasant enough to be willing to spend money
to avoid smelling them again. Although we tried to include only par-
ticipants with a normal sense of smell, we used a self-report mea-
sure. Thus, it is possible that these (or some of these) participants
had a reduced sensitivity to odors that they were not aware of or
not willing to disclose. Regarding the generalizability of our results,
it could mean that the overall influence of odors on decisions is less
strong than our results indicate. Second, we equated monetary
losses and unpleasant odors based on participants' WTP judgments.
This relies on the assumption that participants are able to accurately
price smelling an unpleasant odor. Difficulties in setting a price for
smelling an unpleasant odor might have driven the differences in
choices, suggesting an alternative explanation for why odors or
affect-rich outcomes in general lead to different choices than mone-
tary outcomes (see also McGraw et al., 2010). What speaks against
this explanation is that people's evaluations of unpleasant odors do
not seem to change much over time and are not affected by famil-
iarity (Delplanque et al., 2008; Delplanque, Coppin, Bloesch,
Cayeux, & Sander, 2015), and participants' WTPs in our study were
highly correlated with their odor ratings. Third, we used a combina-
tion of choice data and mathematical modeling to understand the
changes in risky taking. However, to fully understand the cognitive
processes underlying the observed changes in choices, we would
need to use process-tracing methods, such as eye tracking or mouse
tracking, which would allow us to investigate whether the observed
differences in risky decision making can be traced to information
processing, such as the attention allocated to outcomes
(e.g., Lejarraga, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2019;
Pachur, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hertwig, 2018). Finally, in
our study, outcomes were odors, whereas in many decisions such as
when evaluating food items, a new car, or clothes that still smell of
the chemicals used for dying, odors will be just one attribute of the
outcome. Here, it will be important in the future to test whether
odors still affect the sensitivity to probabilities when other attri-
butes also influence the overall utility of an option.
In conclusion, our study shows a qualitative change in decision
processes for affect-rich olfactory outcomes, leading to a reduced
sensitivity to probabilities. These results highlight the importance of
taking olfactory stimulus dimensions into account when studying risky
decision making. Furthermore, by using consequential decisions with
real outcomes, the present study provides solid evidence that the
affective intensity of outcomes is an important factor in risky decision
making that should be taken into account to better understand the
underlying cognitive processes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by a grant from the Swiss National Science
Foundation to the first author (157432). We thank Yvonne
Oberholzer for programming the experiment and Sami Agraniou for
help with collecting the data. The data and analysis scripts for the
Bayesian modeling can be found on OSF (https://osf.io/hrvgb/).
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
None.
ORCID
Bettina von Helversen https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2004-6922
REFERENCES
Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability
weighting functions. Management Science, 46, 1497–1512. https://doi.
org/10.1287/mnsc.46.11.1497.12080
Abdellaoui, M., & Kemel, E. (2014). Eliciting prospect theory when conse-
quences are measured in time units: “Time is not money.”. Manage-
ment Science, 60(7), 1844–1859. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.
1829
7One reason for the relatively high gamma parameters we found in the monetary gambles in
comparison with those reported in the literature could be our design that contained only four
different outcomes. Thus, outcomes changed less between trials than probabilities. This
could have increased the salience of the probabilities compared with other studies with more
outcomes, which in turn could have influenced the probability weighting parameter
(e.g., McGraw et al., 2010).
VON HELVERSEN ET AL. 9
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by
a single-response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9(3),
226–232. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830090304
Berns, G. S., Capra, C. M., Chappelow, J., Moore, S., & Noussair, C. (2008).
Nonlinear neurobiological probability weighting functions for aversive
outcomes. NeuroImage, 39(4), 2047–2057. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2007.10.028
Berns, G. S., Capra, C. M., Moore, S., & Noussair, C. (2007). A shocking
experiment: New evidence on probability weighting and common ratio
violations. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(4), 234–242. Retrieved
from. http://journal.sjdm.org/7801/jdm7801.htm
Bradford, K. D., & Desrochers, D. M. (2009). The use of scents to influence
consumers: The sense of using scents to make cents. Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics, 90(2), 141–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-
0377-5
Chrea, C., Grandjean, D., Delplanque, S., Cayeux, I., Le Calvé, B.,
Aymard, L., … Scherer, K. R. (2009). Mapping the semantic space for
the subjective experience of emotional responses to odors. Chemical
Senses, 34(1), 49–62. https://doi.org/10.1093/chemse/bjn052
Coppin, G., Delplanque, S., Bernard, C., Cekic, S., Porcherot, C.,
Cayeux, I., & Sander, D. (2014). Choice both affects and reflects pref-
erences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 6, 1415–1427.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2013.863953
Coppin, G., Delplanque, S., Porcherot, C., Cayeux, I., & Sander, D. (2012).
When flexibility is stable: Implicit long-term shaping of olfactory pref-
erences. PLoS ONE, 7, 1-13, e37857. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0037857
Coppin, G., Parma, V., & Pause, B. M. (2016). Affective sciences through
the chemical senses. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1-3, 1590. https://doi.
org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01590
Delplanque, S., Coppin, G., Bloesch, L., Cayeux, I., & Sander, D. (2015). The
mere exposure effect depends on an odor's initial pleasantness. Fron-
tiers in Psychology, 6, 1-7, 920. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.
00920
Delplanque, S., Grandjean, D., Chrea, C., Aymard, L., Cayeux, I., Le
Calvé, B., … Sander, D. (2008). Emotional processing of odors: Evi-
dence for a nonlinear relation between pleasantness and familiarity
evaluations. Chemical Senses, 33(5), 469–479. https://doi.org/10.
1093/chemse/bjn014
Demattè, M. L., Endrizzi, I., & Gasperi, F. (2014). Food neophobia and its
relation with olfaction. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1-6, 127. https://doi.
org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00127
Ditto, P. H., Pizarro, D. A., Epstein, E. B., Jacobson, J. A., &
MacDonald, T. K. (2006). Visceral influences on risk-taking behavior.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19(2), 99–113. https://doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.520
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A.-G. (2009). Statistical power
analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression ana-
lyses. Behavior Research Methods, 41, 1149–1160. https://doi.org/10.
3758/BRM.41.4.1149
Ferdenzi, C., Delplanque, S., Atanassova, R., & Sander, D. (2016).
Androstadienone's influence on the perception of facial and vocal
attractiveness is not sex specific. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 66,
166–175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2016.01.016
Ferdenzi, C., Roberts, S. C., Schirmer, A., Delplanque, S., Cekic, S.,
Porcherot, C., … Grandjean, D. (2013). Variability of affective
responses to odors: Culture, gender, and olfactory knowledge. Chemi-
cal Senses, 38(2), 175–186. https://doi.org/10.1093/chemse/bjs083
Ferdenzi, C., Schirmer, A., Roberts, S. C., Delplanque, S., Porcherot, C.,
Cayeux, I., … Grandjean, D. (2011). Affective dimensions of odor per-
ception: A comparison between Swiss, British, and Singaporean
populations. Emotion, 11(5), 1168–1181. https://doi.org/10.1037/
a0022853
Festjens, A., Bruyneel, S., & Dewitte, S. (2018). An appetite for risk? Failure
to replicate the effect of hunger cues on risk taking. Food Quality and
Preference, 68, 415–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodqual.2018.
02.014
Gaillet-Torrent, M., Sulmont-Rossé, C., Issanchou, S., Chabanet, C., &
Chambaron, S. (2014). Impact of a non-attentively perceived odour on
subsequent food choices. Appetite, 76, 17–22. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.appet.2014.01.009
Hayden, B. Y., & Platt, M. L. (2009). Gambling for Gatorade: Risk-sensitive
decision making for fluid rewards in humans. Animal Cognition, 12(1),
201–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-008-0186-8
Herz, R. S., & Cahill, E. D. (1997). Differential use of sensory information in
sexual behavior as a function of gender. Human Nature, 8(3), 275–286.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02912495
Herz, R. S., Eliassen, J., Beland, S., & Souza, T. (2004). Neuroimaging evi-
dence for the emotional potency of odor-evoked memory.
Neuropsychologia, 42(3), 371–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2003.08.009
Hirsch, A. R. (1995). Effects of ambient odors on slot-machine usage in a
Las Vegas casino. Psychology & Marketing, 12, 585–594. https://doi.
org/10.1002/mar.4220120703
Hsee, C. K., & Rottenstreich, Y. (2004). Music, pandas, and muggers:
On the affective psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: General, 133(1), 23–30. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-
3445.133.1.23
Ischer, M., Baron, N., Mermoud, C., Cayeux, I., Porcherot, C., Sander, D., &
Delplanque, S. (2014). How incorporation of scents could enhance
immersive virtual experiences. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1-11, 736.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00736
JASP Team. (2017). JASP (Version 0.8.1.4) [Computer software].
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kechagia, V., & Drichoutis, A. C. (2017). The effect of olfactory sensory
cues on willingness to pay and choice under risk. Journal of Behavioral
and Experimental Economics, 70, 33–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
socec.2017.07.005
Klein, R. A., Vianello, M., Hasselman, F., Adams, B. G., Adams, R. B. Jr.,
Alper, S., … Batra, R. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating variation in
replicability across samples and settings. Advances in Methods and
Practices in Psychological Science, 1(4), 443–490. https://doi.org/10.
1177/2515245918810225
Krawczyk, M. W. (2015). Probability weighting in different domains: The
role of affect, fungibility, and stakes. Journal of Economic Psychology,
51, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.06.006
Lejarraga, T., Pachur, T., Frey, R., & Hertwig, R. (2016). Decisions
from experience: From monetary to medical gambles. Journal of Behav-
ioral Decision Making, 29(1), 67–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.
1877
Lejarraga, T., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2019).
The attention–aversion gap: How allocation of attention relates to loss
aversion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 40, 457–469. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2019.05.008
McGraw, A. P., Shafir, E., & Todorov, A. (2010). Valuing money and things:
Why a $20 item can be worth more and less than $20. Management
Science, 56(5), 816–830. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1147
Mohanty, A., & Gottfried, J. A. (2013). Examining emotion perception and
elicitation via olfaction. In J. L. Armony, & P. Vuilleumier (Eds.), The
Cambridge handbook of human affective neuroscience (pp. 241–264).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
O'Doherty, J. P. (2007). Lights, Camembert, action! The role of human
orbitofrontal cortex in encoding stimuli, rewards, and choices. Annals
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1121, 254–272. https://doi.org/
10.1196/annals.1401.036
Oud, B., & Coppin, G. (2012). Extending the study of decision values to
cases where options are presented using different sensory modalities.
Journal of Neuroscience, 32(7), 2248–2249. https://doi.org/10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.6133-11.2012
10 VON HELVERSEN ET AL.
Pachur, T., Hertwig, R., & Wolkewitz, R. (2014). The affect gap in risky
choice: Affect-rich outcomes attenuate attention to probability infor-
mation. Decision, 1(1), 64–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/dec0000006
Pachur, T., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., Murphy, R. O., & Hertwig, R. (2018).
Prospect theory reflects selective allocation of attention. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 147(2), 147–169. https://doi.org/10.
1037/xge0000406
Pachur, T., Suter, R. S., & Hertwig, R. (2017). How the twain can meet:
Prospect theory and models of heuristics in risky choice. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 93, 44–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2017.01.001
Petrova, D. G., Van der Pligt, J., & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2014). Feeling the
numbers: On the interplay between risk, affect, and numeracy. Journal
of Behavioral Decision Making, 27(3), 191–199. https://doi.org/10.
1002/bdm.1803
Regenbogen, C., Axelsson, J., Lasselin, J., Porada, D. K., Sundelin, T.,
Peter, M. G., … Olsson, M. J. (2017). Behavioral and neural correlates
to multisensory detection of sick humans. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 114(24),
6400–6405. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1617357114
Rimkute, J., Moraes, C., & Ferreira, C. (2016). The effects of scent on con-
sumer behaviour. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 40(1),
24–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.12206
Rosati, A. G., & Hare, B. (2016). Reward currency modulates human risk
preferences. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37(2), 159–168. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.10.003
Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001). Money, kisses and electric shocks:
On the affective psychology of risk. Psychological Science, 12,
185–190. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00334
Schleidt, M., Neumann, P., & Morishita, H. (1988). Pleasure and disgust:
Memories and associations of pleasant and unpleasant odours in Ger-
many and Japan. Chemical Senses, 13(2), 279–293. https://doi.org/10.
1093/chemse/13.2.279
Sharvit, G., Dell'Acqua, C., & Vuilleumier, P. (2018). Modality-specific
effects of aversive expectancy in the anterior insula and medial pre-
frontal cortex. Pain, 159(8), 1529–1542. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.
pain.0000000000001237
Singmann, S., Bolker, B., Westfall, J., & Aust, F. (2016). afex: Analysis of
factorial experiments. R package version 0.16–1. Retrieved from
https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=afex
Stancak, A., Xie, Y., Fallon, N., Bulsing, P., Giesbrecht, T., Thomas, A., &
Pantelous, A. A. (2015). Unpleasant odors increase aversion to mone-
tary losses. Biological Psychology, 107, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
biopsycho.2015.02.006
Stevenson, R. J. (2009). An initial evaluation of the functions of human
olfaction. Chemical Senses, 35(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1093/
chemse/bjp083
Sunstein, C. R., & Zeckhauser, R. (2011). Overreaction to fearsome risks.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 48(3), 435–449. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10640-010-9449-3
Suter, R. S., Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2016). How affect shapes risky
choice: Distorted probability weighting versus probability neglect.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 29(4), 437–449. https://doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.1888
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumu-
lative representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5,
297–323. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00122574
REFERENCES
Goldstein, W. M., & Einhorn, H. J. (1987). Expression theory and the pref-
erence reversal phenomena. Psychological Review, 94(2), 236–254.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.2.236
Scheibehenne, B., & Pachur, T. (2015). Using Bayesian hierarchical parame-
ter estimation to assess the generalizability of cognitive models of
choice. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(2), 391–407. https://doi.
org/10.3758/s13423-014-0684-4
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Bettina von Helversen is a full professor of psychology at the Uni-
versity of Bremen. Her work focuses on understanding and
modeling the cognitive processes underlying people's judgments
and decisions. Her broader research interests include decision
making in applied contexts and decision making over the life span.
Géraldine Coppin is an assistant professor of psychology at the
Swiss Distance Learning University and a senior researcher at the
University of Geneva, Switzerland. She is interested in the psy-
chology and neuroscience of chemosensory perception
(i.e., olfactory and flavor perception) and food intake, in healthy
individuals as well as in clinical populations.
Benjamin Scheibehenne is a full professor of cognition and con-
sumer behavior at the University of Geneva School of Economics
and Management in Switzerland. He works at the inter-
section between cognitive psychology, marketing, and economics
and is interested in how people make judgments and decisions in
an economic context.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the
Supporting Information section at the end of this article.
How to cite this article: von Helversen B, Coppin G,
Scheibehenne B. Money does not stink: Using unpleasant
odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making.
J Behav Dec Making. 2020;1–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/
bdm.2178
VON HELVERSEN ET AL. 11
APPENDIX A
TABLE A1 Set of decisions
No.
Option A Option B
Money OdorOut A1 pA1 (%) Out A2 pA2 (%) Out B1 pB1 (%) Out B2 pB2 (%)
1 Worst 2 0 98 2nd worst 50 0 50 0.90 0.81
2 Worst 10 0 90 2nd worst 60 0 40 0.83 0.81
3 Worst 30 0 70 2nd worst 70 0 30 0.85 0.63
4 Worst 20 0 80 2nd worst 40 0 60 0.71 0.56
5 Worst 10 0 90 2nd worst 99 0 1 0.94 0.85
6 Worst 30 0 70 2nd worst 90 0 10 0.90 0.77
7 Worst 60 0 40 2nd worst 80 0 20 0.58 0.31
8 Worst 2 0 98 3rd worst 50 0 50 0.88 0.73
9 Worst 10 0 90 3rd worst 60 0 40 0.71 0.54
10 Worst 30 0 70 3rd worst 70 0 30 0.67 0.40
11 Worst 20 0 80 3rd worst 40 0 60 0.50 0.25
12 Worst 10 0 90 3rd worst 99 0 1 0.83 0.79
13 Worst 30 0 70 3rd worst 90 0 10 0.69 0.46
14 Worst 60 0 40 3rd worst 80 0 20 0.35 0.23
15 Worst 2 0 98 4th worst 50 0 50 0.72 0.50
16 Worst 10 0 90 4th worst 60 0 40 0.69 0.34
17 Worst 30 0 70 4th worst 70 0 30 0.47 0.25
18 Worst 20 0 80 4th worst 40 0 60 0.56 0.19
19 Worst 10 0 90 4th worst 99 0 1 0.81 0.53
20 Worst 30 0 70 4th worst 90 0 10 0.59 0.34
21 Worst 60 0 40 4th worst 80 0 20 0.22 0.16
22 2nd worst 2 0 98 3rd worst 50 0 50 0.92 0.83
23 2nd worst 10 0 90 3rd worst 60 0 40 0.85 0.75
24 2nd worst 30 0 70 3rd worst 70 0 30 0.79 0.60
25 2nd worst 20 0 80 3rd worst 40 0 60 0.69 0.52
26 2nd worst 10 0 90 3rd worst 99 0 1 0.90 0.81
27 2nd worst 30 0 70 3rd worst 90 0 10 0.77 0.69
28 2nd worst 60 0 40 3rd worst 80 0 20 0.52 0.46
29 2nd worst 2 0 98 4th worst 50 0 50 0.81 0.63
30 2nd worst 10 0 90 4th worst 60 0 40 0.75 0.47
31 2nd worst 30 0 70 4th worst 70 0 30 0.63 0.38
32 2nd worst 20 0 80 4th worst 40 0 60 0.53 0.19
33 2nd worst 10 0 90 4th worst 99 0 1 0.84 0.47
34 2nd worst 30 0 70 4th worst 90 0 10 0.59 0.53
35 2nd worst 60 0 40 4th worst 80 0 20 0.22 0.13
36 3rd worst 2 0 98 4th worst 50 0 50 0.78 0.78
37 3rd worst 10 0 90 4th worst 60 0 40 0.78 0.75
(Continues)
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APPENDIX B: | COMPUTATIONAL MODELINGWITH
CUMULATIVE PROSPECT THEORY
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) assumes that in two outcome lot-
teries with only one nonzero outcome, the subjective value V of an
option A can be described as
V Að Þ=
Xn
i=1
ν xið Þw pið Þ, ðB1Þ
where v(xi) reflects the value assigned to outcome xi according to the
value function of CPT:
v xð Þ= x
a, ifx > 0
− −xð Þa, ifx<0

ðB2Þ
where α reflects the sensitivity to differences in outcomes. This
results in a concave value function for gains and a convex value func-
tion for losses, with lower values of α yielding a stronger curvature. In
the present study, we did not include a loss-aversion parameter
because the choices we investigated contained only losses.
In Equation (B1), w(pi) denotes the probability weighting function
that translates objective probabilities pi into subjective decision
weights according to Goldstein and Einhorn (1987):
w pð Þ= δp
γ
δpγ + 1−pð Þγ , ðB3Þ
where γ captures the sensitivity to differences in probabilities, with
values <1 resulting in a more inverse-S-shaped curvature (indicating
overweighting of small probabilities) and values >1 resulting in a more
S-shaped curvature (indicating underweighting of small probabilities).
The parameter δ reflects the elevation of the weighting function, with
larger values of δ resulting in a higher elevation.
In a choice between two lotteries A and B, CPT predicts that the
lottery with the larger V is preferred. We predicted the choice proba-
bility p(A,B) of lottery A over B, with the softmax choice rule:
p A,Bð Þ= e
θ  V Að Þ
eθ  V Að Þ + eθ  V Bð Þ
, ðB4Þ
where θ is a choice sensitivity parameter reflecting the sensitivity to
differences in the valuations of V(A) and V(B), computed according
to CPT.
Thus, our implementation of CPT involved four free parameters:
α for the value function, γ and δ for the probability weighting function,
and θ for the choice rule. In accordance with CPT's main assumptions,
we restricted the range of the parameter values to theoretically plau-
sible values (e.g., Scheibehenne & Pachur, 2015): 0 < α ≤ 1; 0 < γ ≤ 5;
0 < δ ≤ 5; 0 < θ ≤ 5.
TABLE A1 (Continued)
No.
Option A Option B
Money OdorOut A1 pA1 (%) Out A2 pA2 (%) Out B1 pB1 (%) Out B2 pB2 (%)
38 3rd worst 30 0 70 4th worst 70 0 30 0.69 0.56
39 3rd worst 20 0 80 4th worst 40 0 60 0.72 0.50
40 3rd worst 10 0 90 4th worst 99 0 1 0.84 0.78
41 3rd worst 30 0 70 4th worst 90 0 10 0.84 0.72
42 3rd worst 60 0 40 4th worst 80 0 20 0.38 0.41
Note. The decision problems were created by presenting all combinations of the four outcomes with the set of seven probability pairs. The worse outcome
always occurred with the lower probability. Out A1 and Out A2 denote the possible outcomes of Option A, and Out B1 and Out B2 the possible outcomes
of Option B; pA1, pA2, pB1, and pB2 denote the probability with which the respective outcome would occur. In the odor decisions, Out A1 and Out B1
corresponded to smelling an odor; in the monetary decisions, Out A1 and Out B1 represented the monetary loss corresponding to the WTP of the
participant for the respective odor. The ratings worst to fourth worst refer to the odors and monetary losses ordered based on participants' WTPs. Money
and Odor present the proportions of participants choosing the option with the worse outcome for each gamble.
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